

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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O P 080937Z NOV 76
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3090
INFO USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
USDEL MBFR VIENNA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 18799

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS INFO PRIORITY TO: SECDEF WASHDC,
CINC EUR VAIHINGEN AND USNMR SHAPE. MILITARY ADDEES
TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE.

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OREP (SENATORS NUNN, SAM/BARTLETT, DEWEY F.),
MPOL, MBFR, PFOR, MARR, MILI, GW
SUBJECT: US SENATORS AND FRG FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSS
DEFENSE ISSUES

BEGIN SUMMARY: DURING A ONE-HOUR DISCUSSION BETWEEN
FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER AND SENATORS NUNN AND BARTLETT
OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, ACCOMPANIED BY
THE AMBASSADOR, A NOTEWORTHY SIMILARITY OF VIEW WAS
REVEALED. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION ABOUT THE RESULTS OF
THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS IN WHICH SENATOR NUNN REASSURED
THE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT THE BASIC OUTLINES OF AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY WOULD REMAIN THE SAME, DISCUSSION CEN-
TERED ON MILITARY TOPICS. THE SENATORS AND THE FOREIGN
MINISTER PROCLAIMED THEMSELVES TO BE SKEPTICS ABOUT
MBFR, WITH GENSCHER EMPHASIZING THAT NO GERMAN GOVERN-
MENT OF WHICH HE WAS A MEMBER WOULD EVER ABANDON THE
CONCEPT OF PARITY IN ORDER TO OBTAIN AN MBFR AGREEMENT.
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GENSCHER CLAIMED THAT THE MAIN SOVIET GOAL IN THE

NEGOTIATIONS WAS TO PUT LIMITATIONS ON THE BUNDESWEHR.

IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION FROM SENATOR NUNN, THE FOREIGN MINISTER STATED HIS BELIEF THAT THE SOVIET PURPOSE IN BUILDING UP ITS FORCES OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS WAS TO OBTAIN MORE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OVER CENTRAL EUROPE. GENSCHER WENT ON TO STATE THAT HE COULD NOT BE SO CONFIDENT OF THE AIMS OF THE NEXT GENERATION OF SOVIET LEADERS WHO WOULD NOT HAVE EXPERIENCED WORLD WAR II. THE SENATORS NOTED A MAIN CONCERN WHICH MILITARY MEN REPEATEDLY UTTERED: I.E., WHETHER THE POLITICAL DECISION MAKERS WOULD ALLOW THE MILITARY TO GET READY IN TIME; WOULD A SOVIET MOBILIZATION TRIGGER A WESTERN MOBILIZATION? END SUMMARY.

1. THE U.S. ELECTIONS

AFTER THE USUAL AMENITIES, THE FOREIGN MINISTER EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE PRINCIPAL GUIDELINES OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY WOULD NOT CHANGE AND THAT CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES WOULD CONTINUE. THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT, PRESS AND PUBLIC WERE CONFIDENT THAT WAS THE CASE. HE NOTED THAT IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC THERE WAS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION ON THE MAJOR LINES OF FOREIGN POLICY: THEY BOTH EMPHASIZED THE ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP, THE NATO ALLIANCE, AND EUROPE.

SENATOR NUNN REPLIED THAT THERE HAD BEEN LESS FOREIGN POLICY DIFFERENCES THIS TIME THAN IN ANY OTHER RECENT AMERICAN ELECTION. GOVERNOR CARTER GAVE THE ALLIANCE STRONG SUPPORT. HIS ONE COMPLAINT WAS THAT THE U.S. HAD NOT CONSULTED ENOUGH WITH EUROPE AND JAPAN. FOREIGN POLICY HAD NOT BEEN A CENTRAL THEME IN THE ELECTION AND THE FUTURE WOULD BRING A CHANGE IN STYLE, NOT IN SUBSTANCE.

GENSCHER SAID THAT THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN THE U.S. HAD BEEN SIMILAR TO THE ONE IN THE FRG. HERE THE OPPOSITION PARTIES HAD CLAIMED THAT THEY WERE THE BETTER ALLIANCE

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PARTNERS AND THE BETTER EUROPEANS, WHILE THE GOVERNMENT SAID THAT IT WAS. HE HAD NO DOUBTS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF AMERICA.

2. MBFR

THE FOREIGN MINISTER RAISED THE SUBJECT OF MBFR, NOTING THAT HE WAS A "SKEPTIC." HE SAID THAT HE SAW MBFR AS

A GREAT DANGER, NOT ONLY FOR THE FRG, BUT FOR THE ALLIANCE AND EUROPE. GENSCHER PREDICTED A GREAT

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED.

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PROPAGANDA WAVE FROM MOSCOW AIMED AT GAINING INFLUENCE OVER THE FRG AND OVER THE BUNDESWEHR. THE BUNDESWEHR WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT EUROPEAN ARMED FORCE. SETTING A LIMIT ON THE BUNDESWEHR WAS THE MAJOR SOVIET GOAL IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IS NOT JUST A PROBLEM FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, BUT FOR EUROPE. THE FOREIGN MINISTER WENT ON TO STATE HIS CONCERN THAT "DISARMAMENT" SHOULD NOT BECOME A NEW GOAL FOR THE LEFTISTS REPLACING THE OLD PASSE THEMES OF VIETNAM AND "OSTPOLITIK."

GENSCHER WENT ON TO SAY THAT IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT THE STRONGEST EUROPEAN ALLIANCE PARTNER IS THE ONE MOST SUBJECT TO PRESSURE. THIS ARISES BECAUSE GERMANY IS A DIVIDED COUNTRY AND BECAUSE OF THE EXPOSED POSITION OF WEST BERLIN. DURING GENSCHER'S MOST RECENT TRIP TO THE UNITED NATIONS AT NEW YORK, THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER CONTINUALLY HINTED AT A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WEST BERLIN AND THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER MADE IT APPEAR AS IF FRG CONCESSIONS

ON MBFR WERE NECESSARY FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN THE BERLIN SITUATION. GENSCHER SAID HE HAD TOLD THIS TO PRESIDENT FORD AND TO SECRETARY KISSINGER.

SENATOR NUNN REPLIED THAT HE TOO WAS A SKEPTIC ABOUT
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MBFR. HE FELT THAT THE WEST HAD TO DO A LOT TO IMPROVE ITS OWN DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES BEFORE IT COULD CONCLUDE AN MBFR AGREEMENT. SINCE THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEGUN, THE SOVIET UNION HAD GREATLY INCREASED ITS FORCES. TODAY, IF THE WEST'S ORIGINAL PROPOSALS WERE ACCEPTED, SOVIET FORCES WOULD STILL BE STRONGER THAN OUR OWN. THE SENATOR SAID THAT THIS WAS A RIDICULOUS POSITION IN WHICH TO BE.

THE SENATOR WENT ON TO STATE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO REAL PARITY SHOULD THE SOVIETS ACHIEVE THEIR AIM OF PUTTING A LIMITATION ON THE BUNDESWEHR AND THE U.S. WERE TO WITHDRAW 3,000 MILES ACROSS THE ATLANTIC WHILE THE SOVIETS ONLY PULLED BACK A FEW HUNDRED MILES TO THEIR OWN COUNTRY. SUPPORTING THIS VIEW, FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER NOTED THAT NO SUBMARINES CAN CUT THE LINKS BETWEEN MOSCOW AND HANNOVER. FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER EMPHASIZED THAT AS LONG AS HE REMAINED A MEMBER OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, THE WEST'S DEMAND FOR PARITY WOULD BE MAINTAINED AT ALL COSTS.

3. THE PURPOSE BEHIND THE SOVIET ARMS BUILDUP

SENATOR NUNN ASKED WHAT MIGHT BE BEHIND THE SOVIET ARMS BUILDUP WHICH HAD BEEN UNDERWAY FOR SUCH A LONG TIME. THE FOREIGN MINISTER REPLIED THAT THE PRESENT SOVIET LEADERSHIP PROBABLY WISHED TO USE ITS INCREASED MILITARY POWER IN ORDER TO GAIN MORE POLITICAL INFLUENCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IT WAS UNCERTAIN FOR WHAT PURPOSE THE FUTURE MILITARY LEADERSHIP TEAM IN THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT USE THIS POWER. PERHAPS THEY WOULD NOT SIMPLY USE IT TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL POLITICAL INFLUENCE. AFTER ALL, THE FUTURE LEADERSHIP WOULD HAVE HAD NO PERSONAL EXPERIENCE IN WORLD WAR II, SOMETHING WHICH LED THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP TO BE REALISTIC ABOUT THE RISK OF WAR.

4. WARNING TIME

THE TWO SENATORS RAISED THE PROBLEM OF WARNING TIME. SENATOR NUNN SAID THAT THE MAIN CONCERN OF ALL MILITARY MEN IS WHETHER THE POLITICAL DECISION-MAKERS
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WILL ALLOW THE MILITARY TO GET READY IN TIME. OUR INTELLIGENCE CANNOT TELL WHAT THE SOVIETS WILL DO, ONLY WHAT THE SOVIETS HAVE DONE. THE GREATEST SINGLE ENHANCEMENT TO OUR CAPABILITIES WOULD BE THE FIRM UNDERSTANDING THAT, IF THE SOVIET UNION MOBILIZES, WESTERN DECISION-MAKERS WILL ALLOW OUR FORCES TO GET READY. GETTING READY IS ITSELF A DETERRENT. THE YOM KIPPUR WAR WAS AN EXAMPLE OF HOW POLITICAL DECISION-MAKERS REFUSED TO ACT ON THE INTELLIGENCE WHICH WAS AVAILABLE TO THEM. TO THIS SENATOR BARTLETT ADDED THAT SOME WILL CLAIM THAT A WESTERN MOBILIZATION DESIGNED TO MATCH AN EASTERN MOBILIZATION WOULD BE PROVOCATIVE. SUCH AN UNREALISTIC EVALUATION MUST BE AVOIDED.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER DID NOT DISPUTE THE SENATORS' ANALYSES. HE DID SUGGEST THAT HOW A COUNTRY REACTED TO AN EASTERN MOBILIZATION WOULD BE DIFFERENT IN THE VARIOUS NATO STATES. THIS WOULD ARISE NOT OUT OF ANY PHILOSOPHIC DIFFERENCES, BUT BECAUSE OF THE

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SITUATION GOVERNING IN EACH COUNTRY. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE NOTED THAT IN THE RECENT ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN THE FRG, BOTH SIDES CLAIMED THAT THEIR PARTY WOULD DO THE MOST FOR DEFENSE. IN OTHER NATO COUNTRIES, THE ARGUMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS QUITE THE OPPOSITE. WESTERN POLITICAL LEADERS WOULD HAVE THE NECESSARY FREEDOM FOR MANEUVER IF THERE WERE BOTH A CORRECT EVALUATION OF THE THREAT AND THE EXISTENCE OF THE WILL TO DEFEND ONESELF. OTHERWISE, THIS FREEDOM OF MANEUVER WOULD NOT EXIST.

5. DETENTE

THE FOREIGN MINISTER NOTED THAT THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT, IN CARRYING OUT ITS DETENTE POLICY, HAD EMPHASIZED THAT DETENTE MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE WILL TO DEFEND ONESELF AND THAT AN EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE ALLIANCE IS A NECESSARY CONCOMITANT OF DETENTE. DETENTE WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN A DIVIDED COUNTRY LIKE GERMANY. THE GREAT DANGER OF THE DETENTE POLICY WAS THAT IT MIGHT HAVE BROUGHT ABOUT A FALSE IMAGE OF SECURITY. THE FACT THAT THIS HAD NOT HAPPENED WAS ONE OF THE GREAT SUCCESSES OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT. SENATOR NUNN AGREED WITH THIS ANALYSIS.

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6. THIS REPORT HAS BEEN APPROVED BY SENATORS NUNN AND BARTLETT.
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